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lows a fugitive from justice and apprehends him in another state, he is
entitled to the reward. This Missouri case was cited in the Kentucky case,
Kentucky Bankers' Association v. Cassady. It is established in Missouri
that rewards offered may be recovered by sheriffs for doing what is just
outside the strict limits of their official duties.11
By strictly contruing the duties of sheriffs, the courts enable ther to
recover rewards and extra fees for doing little more than their duties. Thus
the acts of a sheriff outside the strict limits of his official duties are suffi-
cient consideration to enforce a contract of reward or a contract for extra
compensation.
A. T. S.
TAXATION-FEDER.AL ExcisE TAXES--INJUNCTIVE RELIEF-[FEDERAL]*.-
Plaintiff, a soap company, seeks to enjoin a Collector of Internal Revenue
from collecting the tax imposed on the first domestic processing of coconut
oil and palm oil by Section 6 02 1/2 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1934,1 on the
alleged ground that the section is unconstitutional. Held: The allegation
and showing of "ultimate financial ruin resulting from the continued pay-
ment of the tax" was not sufficient to prevent the application of Section
3224 of the Revised Statutes of the United States2 which prohibits the main-
tenance of suits to restrain the collection of taxes. Huston, etc., V. Iowa
Soap Co.3
Historically courts of equity have .been reluctant to grant an injunction
against the levy, assessment, or collection of a tax, since such action would
interfere with governmental activities. 4 Where, however, a well recognized
ground for equitable jurisdiction was present, equity did not hesitate to e*-
ercise its natural jurisdiction even in tax litigation.
In 1867 Congress passed an act which, in language at least, prohibited
suits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.0
There followed a period in which decisions of the Supreme Court, interpret-
ing that section, announced the retention of the court's equitable jurisdic-
11. Smith v. Vernon County, 188 Mo. 501, 87 S. W. 949, 70 L. R. A. 59,
107 Am. St. Rep. 324 (1905); Cornwell v. St. Louis Transit Co., 100 Mo.
App. 258, 73 S. W. 305 (1903).
* For a general survey of the question, see: Note, 21 ST. LOUIS LAW
REVIEW 140 (1936); Note, 18 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW 311 (1933);
Miller, Restraining the Collection of Federal Taxes (1923) 71 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 318.
1. 48 Stat. 602% (a), 26 U. S. C. A. see. 999 (a).
2. 14 Stat. 475, 26 U. S. C. A. see. 1543 (1867).
3. 4 U. S. Law Week 85 (C. C. A. 8, 1936).
4. 4 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1924) sec. 1640 et seq.; 4 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence (3d ed.) sec. 1779; 1 High, Injunctions (4th ed. 1905) sec.
485.
5. Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 108, 110, 20 L. ed. 65 (1870) ; State
R. R. Tax Case 92 U. S. 575, 614, 23 L. ed. 663 (1875).
6. Supra, note 2.
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tion in tax cases.7 These cases dispelled any doubt as to the non-precluding
effect of the statutory declaration.
This period was capped by the decision in 1932 in the case of Miller v.
Standard Nut Margarine Co.8 The majority there held that Revised Statute
32249 was a declaration of the then existing law; and when an injunction is
sought, the established and accepted equitable rule will be applied.1°. A
minority thought that "this statute for more than sixty years has been con-
sistently applied as precluding relief, whatever the equities alleged." But
in that sixty year period Revised Statute 3224 had become meaningless as
far as changing the historical jurisdiction of equity courts was concerned,
if the numerous exceptions to the statute are compared to the previously
existing grounds for equitable interference in tax cases. 2
In 1936, the courts of equity proclaimed even greater power in tax mat-
ters. When the National Industry Recovery Act was declared unconstitu-
tional13 an avalanche of suits were filed by millers and processors who
sought to restrain the collection of the taxes levied in pursuance of the
Agriculture Adjustment Act.'4 The result was a confusion and diversity
of judicial interpretation which decidedly favored the processor.' 5 In the
Rice Millers decision,16 the Supreme Court sustained an injunction on the
sole basis of unconstitutionality. The decision was notable for the absence
of language requiring "special and extraordinary circumstances," "multi-
plicity of suits," "inadequate remedy at law," and like phrases usually the
basis of equitable jurisdiction in tax matters. This and other decisions of
the same period presented the question, is the maxim of "Pay first, litigate
later" no longer of any value.
7. Dodge v. Osborne, 240 U. S. 118, 36 S. Ct. 275, 60 L. ed. 557 (1916);
Bailey v. George, 259 U. S. 16, 42 S. Ct. 419, 66 L. ed. 816 (1922) ; Hill v.
Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 42 S. Ct. 453, 66 L. ed. 822 (1922).
8. 284 U. S. 498, 52 S. Ct. 260, 76 L. ed. 422 (1932).
9. Supra, note 2.
10. Note, 18 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW 311, 314 (1933).
11. 284 U. S. 498, 511, 52 S. Ct. 260, 76 L. ed. 422 (1932).
12. Note, 22 L. R. A. 699; cf., Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66, 40 S. Ct.
435, 64 L. ed. 782 (1920) (inadequate remedy at law); Rowley v. Chicago,
etc. Ry., 68 F (2d) 527 (C. C. A. 10, 1934) (multiplicity of suits); Shaffer
v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 40 S. Ct. 221, 64 L. ed. 445 (1920) (cloud upon
title); Brabham v. Cooper, 9 F. Supp. 904 (D. C. E. D. S. C., 1935) (prop-
erty about to be seized is not liable for the assessment) ; Hubbard Inv. Co.
v. Brast, 59 F (2d) 709 (C. C. A. 4, 1932) (collector is selling property of
non-taxpayer to satisfy demands made upon a taxpayer) ; Lipke v. Lederer,
259 U. S. 557 (1922) (injunction to restrain the collection of a penalty);
Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1895) (suit by stock-
holder to restrain corporation from voluntarily paying an alleged unconsti-
tutional tax).
13. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55
S. Ct. 837, 79 L. ed. 1570.
14. 48 Stat. 31 (1933), amended 1935, 49 Stat. 750, 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 601
et seq.
15. Note, 21 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW 140, 144 (1936).
16. Rickert Rice Mills, Inc., v. Fontenot, 297 U. S. 110, 56 S. Ct. 374, 80
L. ed. 355 (1936).
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In the opinion of the instant case17 the court denies that the decision in
the Rice Millers case lessens the binding force of the ruling of the Supreme
Court in Bailey v. George, the leading decision of the period of interpreta-
tion of Section 3224 referred to above.' 8 It states: "No reason, however, is
assigned for the action taken, and it may have resulted from a showing of
exceptional circumstances not present in this case. * * * We are not author-
ized to depart from the rule laid down in Bailey v. George, supra, upon a
mere conjecture as to what the Supreme Court may have had in mind in
the absence of some expression upon that point."'19 And properly so; for the
court, in the Rice Millers decision, did not either directly or indirectly,
question the validity or propriety of congressional limitations upon suits
relating to taxation.20 Again the courts adds:21 "Mere apprehension of
'ultimate' ruin to plaintiff's business on account of a tax is not sufficient to
entitle one to injunctive relief in equity. It must appear that such ruin is
so imminent that the remedy provided by law is not adequate. Allegations
of mere hardship or injustice of the tax are not a recognized foundation of
equitable jurisdiction." (Italics supplied.)
It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court, in view of its previous
pronouncement, will accept the above limitation on the restraining power
in tax cases.
J. IR. G.
Editor's Note: The Department of Justice has filed a memorandum ask-
ing the Supreme Court of the United States to define with more exactness
the jurisdiction of federal courts in federal tax injunction suits. The memo-
randum states that the decision in Houston v. Iowa Soap Co. was clearly
right, but public interest will be promoted by a decision of the Supreme
Court. In stating the need for clarification, the memorandum points to the
inharmonious decisions commented upon above and to the Rice Millers cases.
The memorandum concludes "... an early decision is of utmost importance
to the orderly and uninterrupted collection of federal revenues." 4 U. S.
Law Week 153 (Oct. 20, 1936).
TORTS - DAMAGES - RECOVERY FOR PHYSICAL INJURIES RESULTING FROM
NERVOUS SHOCK OR FRIGHT-[Missouri].-The defendant, while arresting a
drunken man, flourished a revolver and negligently fired a shot which struck
plaintiff's husband in the head, killing him. His body, in falling to the
ground, as the plaintiff later recollected, slightly brushed her person. The
sight of this, however, caused the plaintiff great mental anguish and shock,
and she later suffered such physical injuries as nervous convulsions, nervous
indigestion, insomnia and general physical debility. Held; that no recovery
17. Huston, etc., v. Iowa Soap Co., 4 U. S. Law Week 85 (C. C. A. 8,
1936).
18. Supra, note 7.
19. 4 U. S. Law Week 85, 86 (C. C. A. 8, 1936).
20. Los Angeles Soap Co. v. Rogan, 14 F. Supp. 112 (D. C. S. D. Cal.,
1936); Simonin's Sons, Inc., v. Rothensies, 13 F. Supp. 807 (D. C. E. D.
Pa., 1936) ; Mellon v. Mertz, 82 F. (2d) 872 (D. C. App., 1936).
21. 4 U. S. Law Week 85, 85 (C. C. A. 8, 1936).
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